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Abstract: China‟s increasing presence in several Latin American countries is having different 
effects on national political arenas, probably making room for new specific cleavages. This 
article is an exploratory study with the purpose of identifying political reactions to China‟s 
growing economic presence in three differently sized Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Venezuela and Nicaragua). Our analytical perspective considers China-related issues as part 
of the foreign policy agenda in Latin American countries and, in turn, foreign policy issues as 
a phenomenon that can be observed like any other public policy issue. That is, a realm where 
actors inside or outside the state use political resources and energy to advance their own 
preferences. In analyzing the diverse circumstances generated by China‟s economic presence 
in each of the selected cases, we hope to contribute to studies on the politicization of foreign 
policy in Latin American countries. 
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Introduction 
China‟s increasing presence in several Latin American countries is having different effects on 
national political arenas. Impacts derived from China‟s relevance as commercial partner, 
investor, and international lender for social and infrastructural projects are visible not only 
throughout the formation of a new axis of power in Latin America, but are also increasingly 
making room for new specific domestic cleavages. In this exploratory study, our purpose is to 
identify political reactions to the growing Chinese presence in three Latin American 
countries: Brazil, Venezuela and Nicaragua. They have contrasting characteristics in almost 
every aspect except that relations with China have become a salient feature of their foreign 
policy agenda. 
We also intend to expand current analytic efforts on the emergence of new global 
players to a more intensive overview on the degree to which foreign relations are internalized 
as part of the domestic political struggles. Then, our analytical perspective takes China-related 
issues as part of the foreign policy agenda in Latin American countries and, in turn, foreign 
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policy issues as a phenomenon that shall be observed like any other public policy issue. That 
is, a realm where actors inside or outside the state mobilize political resources and energy to 
advance their own preferences.  
The article starts by reviewing salient arguments about the rise of China and its impacts 
on Latin America, noticing that too little attention has been paid to how domestic forces react 
or accommodate to the growing presence of Chinese interests inside their countries. Then, we 
present theoretical arguments about how public policy – and foreign policy as a particular 
instance of it – often operates according to dynamics of politicization which imply the 
existence of conflict arenas where different projects and interests are at stake. In this sense, 
this text is part of a growing amount of literature acknowledging the theoretical and empirical 
artificiality of considering the state as a single unit model regarding foreign policy issues. 
In the third section, we present evidence of how Chinese interests are leading to the 
creation of more or less intensive political arenas in three Latin American countries: 
Venezuela, Nicaragua and Brazil. In all of these cases, China (and Chinese companies) is an 
important partner either for trade, investment, financial accords or infrastructure projects. 
Notwithstanding, they are also very different regarding their territorial dimensions, economic 
structure, sociopolitical cleavages and, as we shall see, the ways in which the Chinese 
presence is politicized. Those differences allow us to identify, in a variety of circumstances, 
the ways in which the growing importance of China for Latin American economies is having 
an impact on the domestic political arenas. 
 
1. The Growing Presence of China in Latin American Countries 
Global attention to China‟s rise in scholarly literature has an important subset of questions 
related to the specific impact on Latin America, focusing primarily on economic aspects or 
geopolitical implications. Most accounts of the recent economic ties between China and Latin 
American partners state that its growing dynamism began in the first half of the past decade 
(Ferchen, 2011; Holland and Barbi, 2010; Vadell, 2011). Latin American countries mainly 
export oil, gas, minerals and agricultural products to China. Latin America imports 
manufactured goods from China. Chinese companies are partners in joint ventures with local 
private or state owned firms, frequently on infrastructural projects or the extraction of natural 
resources. China‟s financial institutions also act as a lender, often in relation with contracts 
for energy exports, or as a means to finance Chinese imports. Because of China‟s importance 
to sustain Latin American countries‟ economic growth, these links are viewed as a 
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longstanding trend connected to changes in the global political economy (Vadell, 2011). But 
there are also arguments linking that trend to a boom of heavy industries inside China that 
will not necessarily last forever (Ferchen, 2011). In any case, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, 
Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Cuba are identified as the countries where China has 
concentrated its commercial interests and investments in the region (Holland and Barbi, 2010; 
Vadell, 2011) – given China‟s energy interests, an important oil-producer like Venezuela 
should also figure on this list.  
There is also a debate concerning the impact of China on the way in which these Latin 
American countries develop ties with the global economy. On the one hand, there are those 
who view the relation as a positive complementarity and, on the other, those who think that a 
North-South dependency pattern is being settled between Latin America and China
3
. A win-
win cooperation discourse is primarily used by the Chinese government when describing its 
policy toward Latin America (People‟s Republic of China, 2008). It is echoed by 
policymakers, scholars and observers who emphasized a set of opportunities for both sides. 
On the other hand, more critic assessments include warning remarks about a renewed pattern 
of core-periphery dependency links in which Latin American countries specialize in exporting 
commodities while imports from China are mostly value-added manufactured goods (Bernal-
Meza, 2015; Ferchen, 2011; Vadell, 2011). 
Others see important consequences to the current equilibrium of economic powers in 
the region should a trend in Chinese foreign investment in Latin America be maintained. In 
this case, Brazil is appointed as the main loser of regional influence (Holland and Barbi, 
2010). As for the effects on the internal economic structure, Brazil and other countries with 
significant levels of industrialization (such as Argentina and Mexico) are also depicted as 
experiencing serious damage derived from the challenge posed by Chinese manufactured 
goods. This is not the case for countries such as Chile or Peru, having a less significant 
industrial sector to be worried about. On the contrary, their commodities-led exports profile is 
a very positive feature for their relations with China in the short run (Vadell, 2011). 
Among all this rich literature exploring structural trends in Latin America related to the 
global rise of China, no great attention is dedicated to how it is having an impact on the 
political realm inside those countries. In a study on cooperation and assistance for 
                                                 
3
 For Ferchen (2011), both sides shared the basic assumption that China‟s growing 
development is necessarily related to an equally growing need for commodities in Latin 
America and elsewhere, but he contends that this assumption is wrong and could lead to 
misleading expectations in the long term. 
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development activities of China in Latin America, Adriana Abdenur and Danilo de Souza 
Neto (2013) report that local NGOs and communities are basically feeling excluded from 
decision-making processes in projects financed by Chinese funds. Conflicts between Chinese 
companies, indigenous groups and local authorities on environmental, fiscal and labor issues 
in Peru and Ecuador are also mentioned. The authors also make the case for a more intense 
debate about the issues raised by Chinese assistance policies between governmental officials, 
private investors and civil society organizations involved in so-called South-South 
cooperation schemes.  
Omar Bonilla (2014) has a more detailed account of how the search for oil in Ecuador, 
in which Chinese companies participate as partners, is having an impact on indigenous 
communities neighboring oil camps. For him, abuse of labor conditions imposed by Chinese 
extractive companies is at the core of emerging conflicts in the region. Javier Vadell (2011) 
reports that, in 2010, as a consequence of the boom of Chinese manufactured goods imports, 
Brazil‟s and Argentina‟s governments took a common stand to protect industrial sectors 
threatened by Chinese products. As part of these bi-national articulations, there is certainly a 
domestic chapter to be told about how local industrial associations turn on the political arena 
to influence their governments‟ attitudes in situations where the relations with China are 
perceived more as a threat than as an opportunity.  
Independently of the effectiveness of these specific moves or the responses adopted by 
China, what interests us in this article is the identification of political conflicts arising as a 
consequence of China‟s growing presence in Latin America. In the following sections, we 
present three cases, three countries in which China-related issues are having an impact on the 
domestic political arena, although with very different intensities and patterns of mobilization 
among relevant political actors.  
 
2. The Politicization Agenda: Seeing Foreign Policy as a Public Policy 
It seems important to stress that the phenomenon of politicization transcends its occurrence in 
the foreign policy realm, or a country‟s international relations, more broadly speaking. We 
define politicization as a political phenomenon which always occurs when, in a specific 
political arena, there are social actors who have conflicting preferences about a specific issue 
and these actors mobilize organizational resources, or simply behave politically, in order to 
influence public policies. In this sense, what we call politicization refers to political disputes 
around some public policy, around which relevant political actors mobilize to put pressure on 
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the public arena. Following our research interest in politicization, we assume that: firstly, 
changes in foreign policy/international relations may generate internal political effects; 
secondly, foreign policy is to be taken as a public policy, like many others; thirdly, domestic 
actors may have divergent preferences about specific foreign policy issues; fourthly, specific 
issues may generate different levels and modalities of politicization; and, finally, we assume 
that actors usually form coalitions according to their preferences, but these coalitions do not 
necessarily match with preexisting political cleavages. 
In other words, politicization is a process of inserting a public issue into an arena of 
disputes among actors with divergent and/or convergent preferences. Of course not all public 
issues generate dynamics of politicization. That is, in a given context some themes and 
decisions may generate disputes of greater intensity, while others may have a less conflictive 
pattern of actors‟ accommodation. We may estimate the intensity of each political actor by 
inferring it from its behavioral and organizational political investment to affirm some 
preference. What are the dynamics that influence different intensities of these actors‟ 
preferences and modes of acting politically? What are the main thematic issues politicized by 
the main relevant actors under analysis in a specific political arena? How do specific actors 
define their interests around a public issue and how do they form coalitions to pursue these 
preferences? These are some of the main issues of interest to us in our current joint 
researches. 
 Following Elmer Shattschneider (1960), politics means conflict. Therefore, it would 
be impossible to understand politics without analyzing the content of prevailing political 
disputes and how they structure political arenas as well as the actors‟ behaviors and coalitions. 
For him, the creation of factions, parties and other political groups is an essential part of 
politics, and their political struggles may set diverse coalitions and configurations of the 
public arena around specific issues. These dynamics generate changes in power relations as 
well as winners and losers. Additionally, the author points to the frequent hierarchization of 
different kinds of conflicts by actors. That is, in any society we may have many different 
conflicts of interests and which of them are to gain priority in the public agenda is also a 
matter to be disputed among these conflicting interests‟ actors.     
Another source of theoretical inspiration comes from Torcuato Di Tella (2003), who 
defines the political game as the coalitions built among actors who have different preferences 
and behaviors around public issues. He develops categories to analyze the coalition building 
processes, as for example the concept of affinity, which may vary from partial affinity, when 
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actors converge only in one specific issue, until total affinity, the limit condition of political 
identity around a whole set of issues. The opposite situation, i.e. no affinity at all, is referred 
to as the concept of antagonism, which may also be characterized as partial when actors 
diverge only in one specific issue, or total: the limit condition when actors clash in all relevant 
issues. He also admits the possibility of having punctual affinities, particularly when actors 
diverge on most issues but have convergent preference in one issue or have a common 
political antagonist to be faced by the coalition. In any case, coalition patterns are of central 
interest to our research agenda: How are they formed and transformed? Which coalitions are 
more time lasting and which have a more tactical meaning? And how do they relate to broader 
existing political cleavages in a political arena? These are some additional interrogatives that 
guide research on the politicization of public policies. 
In the same context, the concept of political cleavage is of special interest because it 
allows theoretically social divisions that acquire political relevance to connect with their role 
in structuring the coalition-building processes. Alan Zuckerman (1975) once published an 
extensive theoretical analysis of the concept, where he found a recurrent meaning of political 
cleavages as specifically deep and long-term divisions within a political society. Instead, we 
prefer not to be so restrictive with the concept‟s content and, consequently, we admit the 
validity of the concept even when applied to particular conjunctures, and not necessarily 
anchored in pervasive and preexisting divisions within societies. 
Another topic refers to the empirical question of what kinds of issues are more 
frequently politicized in a particular political society. It is reasonable to admit that different 
issues may mobilize the main actors with diverse degrees of intensity. Some authors cited by 
Zuckerman have explored religious, ethnical, regional, class, and also foreign policy political 
cleavages, such as Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), Robert Dahl (1965) and Hans 
Daadler (1966).  
All this literature feeds our theoretical and empirical investigations, as well as the 
theoretical model of Theodore Lowi (1964), who identifies how different characteristics of 
public policies may influence different modalities of arenas elected by actors to advance their 
policy preferences. In his view, we may find three kinds of public policies according to their 
effects: distributive, regulatory and redistributive policies. The first one is characterized by 
the possibility of dividing the public resources in individual shares to favor specific actors or 
sectors. Consequently, a distributive public policy tends to create diverse political coalitions 
based on the principle of mutual non-interference. The second category is applied to those 
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policies that have the power to change rules that, by definition, do not allow the 
disentanglement of benefits and costs. These regulatory policies generate coalitions based on 
the logic of the interest groups, which trying to put rules in their favor while disputing the 
content with other groups. The third kind of public policy is the redistributive one, described 
as having the capacity to affect the sharing of benefits and costs among entire different social 
classes or segments. As a consequence, it tends to generate the broadest and most polarized 
political coalitions.     
The approach defended here stands in defense of an interdisciplinary dialogue with 
other thematic literatures (e.g., executive-legislative relations, bureaucracies, representative 
and participatory institutions, legislative studies, political parties, social movements etc. Some 
of the references are commonly cited in the Brazilian case (e.g., Lima 2000 and 2013). 
Salomón and Pinheiro (2013) and Milani and Pinheiro (2013) advance a proposal of intense 
dialogue with neoclassical realists such as Gideon Rose (1998), Randall Schweller (2004) and 
Fareed Zakaria (1998), as well as other theorists of foreign policy analysis such as 
Christopher Hill (2003), Helen Milner (1997) and Lisa Martin (2000). In the next section, we 
present a three-case exploratory study of domestic reactions to China‟s presence in Brazil, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela with these research interests in mind.    
 
3. Domestic Reactions to China’s Presence in Three Cases: Nicaragua, Venezuela and 
Brazil 
3.1 Nicaragua: small country, big politicization 
Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, the presence of China in Nicaragua has launched 
an intensive wave of political contestation around the construction of an inter-oceanic canal 
by Chinese businessman Wang Jing. This project has raised huge expectations as a tool to 
foster economic development, but communities surrounding the projected canal route, as well 
as environmentalist organizations, are making visible a political movement against it. As in 
the case of Venezuela, to be seen in the following section, this conflict follows for the most 
part the patterns of confrontations between government and opposition, but it seems to have 
brought to the political arena a set of actors that would not have been mobilizing against the 
government if the Canal project had not been announced. 
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The project has an estimated cost of around US$50 billion, which is more than four times the 
Nicaraguan GDP in 2014
4
. A 50-year concession was given to the Hong Kong Nicaragua 
Development Investment Group (HKND), renewable for another 50 years. According to a 
draft of the project released by the company, the construction should be finished in 2019, 
including complementary facilities: a bridge for the Pan-American highway over the canal, a 
ferry, power generating and transmission facilities, cement plants, a free-trade zone, tourist 
hotels and an airport (HKND Group, 2014: 14).  
Defined as “the largest civil operation in history, requiring the excavation of 
approximately 5,000 Mm3” (HKND Group, 2014: 16), it implies a projected 715Mm3 
freshwater dredging in the Nicaragua Lake segment in order to reach the minimum depth 
required to receive ships larger than those intended to transit across the expanded Panama 
Canal. Aside with salinization risks and massive reallocation of peasant communities, these 
are the main motivations for the intensive street mobilization that took a prominent position 
among political issues in this Central American country. 
Since the 19th century, Nicaragua expected to be the place where an inter-oceanic canal 
would be built. Before the inauguration of the USA East - West railroad in 1869, it was easier 
to go across Nicaragua (or Panama) than to take the difficult, longer and dangerous journey 
across the U.S. mid-west territories, at the time poorly populated (Folkman, 2001). The canal 
was finally constructed in Panama at the beginning of the 20th century, but it remained as a 
pervasive illusion conceived by economic and political elites as a possible solution to the 
country‟s historical problems (Baltodano, 2015). President Daniel Ortega and other 
government officials emphasize the scenarios of prosperity that the inter-oceanic canal would 
bring, including job creation during and after the construction, significant poverty reduction, 
and economic growth rates around 12% in 2018
5
. 
The anti-canal side insists that it is still not clear what the environmental costs are, 
notably regarding the impact of the Nicaragua Lake dredging and salinization. After two years 
of research, the British firm Environmental Resource Management (ERM) presented to the 
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 According to World Bank data, Nicaraguan GDP was US$11.81 billion in 2014. See 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/nicaragua. [Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
5
 For prospects about progress for economic growth, job creation and poverty eradication, see 
“Unida Nicaragua Triunfa” n. 101, 9/07/2013 
(http://www.tortillaconsal.com/nicaragua_triunfa_101.doc). [Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
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government the results of its environmental impact studies on May 31, 2015
6
. The 
government called for public consultations on it in September, but they were held in a single 
session where no anti-canal voices where invited. Also, the full version of the ERM studies 
was effectively never made public.
7
 NGOs and local communities argue that the canal is 
equivalent to a death sentence for the Nicaragua Lake, which is the greatest freshwater 
reservoir in Central America
8
. The policy for land expropriations needed for the canal is 
another highly conflicting issue. According to bill 840, which regulates the concession to the 
HKND Group, current owners will be paid their property on a cadastral value basis, allegedly 
far below market prices. Expropriation being compulsory, it has spread the fear that thousands 
of people will be submitted to forced displacement.  
Around 50 street protests against the canal have been counted by activists until October 
2015. Peasant communities, ecologists, human rights organizations, NGO‟s and opposition 
political parties are prominent participants. Additionally, they have built common 
organizational platforms to amplify their voice and coordinate action. Two important 
coalitions of this kind are: The National Council for the Defense of the Land, the Lake and 
National Sovereignty; and the Cocibolca Group. Rather than being led by established political 
parties, they are the expression of how political tensions arise in direct reaction to the would-
be most major infrastructural project ever built by a Chinese company in Latin America.  
President Daniel Ortega had comfortably secured reelection in 2011 with 63% of the 
vote, followed by the Independent Liberal Party (PLI – 31%) and the Liberal Constitutional 
Party (PLC – 6%). Ortega and his party, the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN), 
have been ruling the country all along the 1980s, as a consequence of a leftist revolutionary 
movement which overthrew Dictator Anastasio Somoza from power in 1979. Having lost the 
presidential election in 1990, the FSLN experienced a period of internal splits and ideological 
reorientations until they returned to the Presidency in 2007. Ortega‟s recovery was the result 
of a combination of persistent ties with active social organizations, controversial pacts with 
                                                 
6
 See “Muestran en foto estudios de impacto ambiental del canal”. In Confidencial, June 1, 
2015 (http://www.confidencial.com.ni/archivos/articulo/21908/muestran-solo-en-foto-
estudios-de-impacto-ambiental-del-canal). [Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
7
 See “Urgen estudio independiente del canal”. In Confidencial, September 26, 2015 
(http://confidencial.com.ni/urgen-estudio-independiente-del-canal/). [Accessed on 5 October 
2015] 
8
 See, for example, “Temen crisis de agua por Gran Canal”, La Prensa, September 30, 2014. 
(http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2014/09/30/nacionales/213823-temen-crisis-de-agua-por-gran-
canal-temen-crisis-de-agua-por-gran-canal). [Accessed on 5 October 2015] 
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former enemies, and deep divisions among other competitive political forces. As a President, 
he has been able to increase his popularity by implementing a myriad of focused social 
programs and strengthening ties with relevant sociopolitical actors (such as the business class 
and the Catholic church). Nevertheless, this new decade of Ortega in power has also been 
marked by criticisms of democratic setbacks, the undermining of check-and-balance 
mechanisms and serious attempts to limit the space for political contestation.
9
 Opposition 
parties, such as the Movement of Sandinista Renovation (MRS), the PLI, and the Liberal 
Party Alliance (PAL), which are in the process of building a National Coalition for 
Democracy, have publicly supported the anti-canal movement. Nevertheless, it has been done 
more as sympathizers and supporters rather than as leading organizations.  
The Academy of Science of Nicaragua (ACN) is another resonant voice expressing 
serious concerns about the way in which the government is conducting the process. Jorge 
Huet-Perez, ACN‟s vice-president, signed an editorial in the journal Science calling for a 
reconsideration of the project (Huete-Perez et al., 2015) and, in 2014, the academy published 
a book with arguments from a diversity of academic backgrounds expressing critical 
assessments of different aspects of the project (Academia de Ciencias de Nicaragua, 2014). 
Anti-imperialists and sovereignty claims are characteristic of massive protests against 
the canal. Anti-Chinese wall writings are easily seen across public spaces near the projected 
canal zone. President Daniel Ortega is often depicted as a traitor and Chinese investors as 
contemporary imperialistic agents substituting traditional Uncle Sam emissaries. According to 
a report from the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), an organization 
sympathetic to the anti-canal coalition, this project has raised the most intensive opposition 
among the infrastructure plans in the country. For this NGO, the canal was responsible for a 
significant increase in political violence and repression during 2014 (CENIDH, 2015: 3–5). 
In spite of this mobilization, the pro-canal side is, by no means, small. And perhaps not 
even a minority. Of course, the governing party, the Sandinista Front of National Liberation 
(FSLN), and its militants and sympathizers, strongly support the inter-oceanic plans. The 
business community gathered around the COSEP, the most politically relevant productive 
sectors‟ organization in the country, after denouncing the risks for private property and 
sovereignty concerns, was invited by Wang Jing to visit China in November 2014 to get more 
                                                 
9
 For further analyses of the contemporary Nicaraguan political process, see: Martí i Puig 
(2013a); Martí i Puig (2013b); Perla and Cruz-Feliciano (2013); and John A. Booth et. al. 
(2015). 
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involved in the process. After the trip, José Adan Aguerri, COSEP‟s president, said that the 
canal project deserved the benefit of the doubt.
10
 Other businessmen have, on several 
occasions, expressed their interests in embracing the opportunities associated with the Grand 
Canal. On the other hand, according to a poll conducted by the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2014, 72% of Nicaraguans have positive expectations for job 
creation once the construction of the canal begins, 51% think it will boost national 
development, 43.4% are worried about environmental impacts, but, at the same time, 91.3% 
are against expropriations as regulated by bill 840. This poll also showed that FSLN 
supporters are more likely to be enthusiastic about the Canal and less worried about 
environmental impacts (Coleman, 2015). 
Canal debates are also impinged by a skeptical approach among critics. The question of 
whether the Canal will be constructed at all is nourished by a bundle of facts and speculations. 
First of all, the figure of the main HKDN shareholder, Wang Jing, is surrounded by doubts 
and incomplete information
11
. It is known that he has made his fortune in the telecom sector, 
but little ground of experience is recognized in infrastructural projects. Questions also arise 
about how exactly the canal construction will be financed. Wang Jing‟s plan is to attract 
international investors. Nevertheless, in October 2015, the Bloomberg Billionaires Index 
showed that he has lost 84% of his net worth in the context of Chinese equity markets shocks 
in August 2015
12
. How could he convince investors of joining the Canal risks with such a 
personal performance?, some ask.  
But for canal critics, this kind of uncertainty about the canal is no reason to relax. On 
the contrary, it could be a serious indication that the real danger is not the Canal itself, but the 
variety of side-projects that are contemplated by the same 50-year concession awarded to Mr. 
Wang. According to this logic, even if the canal never becomes a reality, it will still be a 
myriad of infrastructure projects that can take advantage of the generous regulations now 
legally conceded to Chinese investors (Baltodano, 2015). For these activists, it is sufficient to 
                                                 
10
 See the interview with Carlos F. Chamorro “El canal y los empresarios: COSEP otorga con 
entusiasmo el “beneficio de la duda” as part of the program Esta semana, broadcasted in 
November 2013, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNBu83-3bng. [Accessed 
on 5 June 2015] 
11
 See “La „telaraña‟ de Wang Jing y la conexión militar con China”. In: Confidencial, 
November 03, 2014 (http://confidencial.com.ni/la-telarana-de-wang-jing-y-la-conexion-
militar-con-china/). [Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
12
 See “This Chinese Billionaire Has Lost More Than Glasenberg in 2015”. In Bloomberg, 
October 1, 2015 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02/china-billionaire-
with-canal-dream-confronts-biggest-loss-of-15). [Accessed on 5 October 2015] 
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continue the struggle against a model of foreign cooperation allegedly pernicious to national 
sovereignty and human rights. 
 
3.2 The Venezuelan case: government/opposition politicizing axis 
China is an important political issue in Venezuela as long as the opposition forces perceive 
that relation as a central piece of a foreign policy that they completely reject. For this reason, 
the politicization of the Chinese presence in Venezuela follows current patterns of 
government/opposition tensions. Nevertheless, specific features of the growing importance of 
China as a foreign financial alternative for the Venezuelan state has raised direct criticism. 
Lack of transparency and fear of losing sovereignty are at the center of the arguments. 
China-Venezuela relations became more intensive around 2008. Oil exports and joint 
ventures in oil production were a central driven-force in the process, but cooperation branches 
were also established in a variety of infrastructure projects and technical domains, including 
the military. One of the reasons for this bilateral intensification was the Venezuelan search for 
alternative markets for its oil exports, until now heavily concentrated in the United States. The 
anti-imperialistic goals of the Hugo Chavez government should be accompanied with a 
consequent oil policy intended to reduce ties with the western superpower. At the time, 
agreements signed with China regarding oil sales were always explained as a footstep towards 
a gradual increase in exports
13
. In addition, it was also then that China intensified its search 
for energy and commodities in Latin America and other developing countries. 
In domestic politics, 2007 was the year of the electoral awakening of opposition parties 
in Venezuela. In December of that year, they were able to defeat Chavez in a referendum 
proposed to modify 69 constitutional articles, seen by the government as a fundamental step 
towards the transition to a “21th Century-Socialism”. This important victory enhanced 
opposition factions that see the electoral arena as the only viable battlefield to be explored, 
                                                 
13
 In 2008, according to Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA), 250 thousand oil barrels per day 
were sent to China, which represented already a significant upgrade compared to 49 thousand 
b/d in 2005. At the time, it was often stated that the goal was to send one million b/d in 2015 
(See: “Acuerdo de cooperacion tecnologica con China”, in El Universal, April 06, 2008; 
“Ramirez afirma que „China es el principal socio petrolero de Venezuela”, in El Universal, 
December 29, 2012). In September 2015, during a visit to China, President Nicolas Maduro of 
Venezuela declared that oil exports to China were about 700 thousand b/d and reaffirmed that 
the purpose is to send one million b/d (See: “Maduro: China y Venezuela estamos más unidos 
que nunca¨. In: El Universal, September 02, 2015 
(http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/150902/maduro-china-y-venezuela-estamos-mas-
unidos-que-nunca). [Accessed on 5 October 2015] 
Fidel Pérez Flores & Daniel Jatobá  JCIR Special Issue (2016) 
 
140 
 
after the failed attempt to overthrow Chavez with a coup d‟état in 2002, a general strike in 
2002/2003 and electoral boycott in the 2005 Legislative elections. In 2008, the fragmented 
landscape of opposition parties and movements was partially successful in building electoral 
fronts to support common candidates in regional contests after a pact signed in January. In 
June 2009, they restructured its coalition under the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), 
which is still the main oppositional front in Venezuela. 
Despite the notorious heterogeneity of its members, MUD has been able to maintain 
itself as a reasonable cohesive organization for electoral purposes. As part of a set of 
arguments rejecting different aspects of the Chavez and Maduro administrations, 
condemnations to foreign policy are unanimous among MUD members. In their general 
principles for the 2012 presidential election (Mesa de la Unidad Democratica, 2012), Chavez‟ 
foreign policy is depicted as a conflictive one, seeking non-pacifist geopolitical alliances, 
intervening in internal affairs of several countries, and using oil as a blackmail tool in 
international politics. 
At the core of the relation the Venezuelan government has built with China is a loans-
for-oil arrangement through which Venezuela has access to state credits via the China 
Development Bank, while Venezuelan oil barrels are shipped to China on a long-term basis as 
a way of payment. Those credits are transferred to the Venezuelan Development Bank 
(BANDES) from which they are transformed into special funds, such as the so-called Fondo 
Chino (Chinese Fund).  
These special funds have been specially targeted by opposition actors, spreading 
denunciations about governmental mismanagement by avoiding parliamentary accountability 
and maintaining Chinese credits out of official public debt records. Congressman Miguel 
Angel Rodriguez, elected as a MUD candidate in 2010, has been a leading voice in that 
respect. In November 2011, using a PDVSA internal report, he claimed that the oil-for-loans 
deal with China is destabilizing the state owned oil company finances. He also raised doubts 
about whether these oil barrels are in fact being sold to China at market prices or whether they 
are shipped at lower rates, as has been suggested in the PDVSA documents. Finally, 
Rodriguez also exposed the mechanism through which Chinese funds are kept outside normal 
audit mechanisms: while these foreign resources are transformed into funds through the 
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BANDES, the government does not need to include them as part of the national treasury and, 
as a consequence, they remain safe from Legislative oversight
14
. 
During the 2012 presidential contest, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonsky 
defended, in his electoral program, approved by all parties in the coalition, the notion that the 
relation with China has been characterized by the signature of non-transparent contracts 
exchanging oil for loans to be used for purposes not related to the oil industry (Mesa de la 
Unidad Democratica, 2012). Radonsky also publicly condemned Executive directives 
allowing the exploitation of gold mines by Chinese companies arguing that Venezuelan 
resources should no more be surrender to foreign countries
15
. Other voices on the opposition 
side have made similar claims, comparing the relation with China to classical imperialistic 
abuse in which a powerful country takes over the natural resources of a weaker one with the 
collaboration of the national government
16
. Current president Nicolas Maduro and prominent 
members of his cabinet often have to repeatedly disqualify opponents as “liars” and reaffirm 
the important role that China is playing in projects of national development
17
. 
The most traditional and politically relevant entrepreneurships‟ organization in the 
country – the Federación Venezolana de Cámaras de Comercio y Producción, 
FEDECÁMARAS – has publicly complained about the fact that that Chinese investors find 
relatively greater facilities in the country compared to the support that the Maduro‟s 
administration has given to national investors. The private sector‟s position in relation to 
                                                 
14
 See: “Pdvsa desatendió pagos al Fisco por presión del Fondo Chino” in El Universal, 
November 11, 2011 (http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/111111/pdvsa-desatendio-pagos-
al-fisco-por-presion-del-fondo-chino). [Accessed on 5 June 2015]. See also the original press 
conference where congressman Rodriguez made this denunciation at “Miguel Angel 
Rodriguez denuncia fraude con Fondo Chino (parte 2)”, at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWNyN4kyvsc. [Accessed on 5 June 2015]  
15
 See: “No entregaremos nuestros recursos a otros países”, in El Universal, September 23, 
2012 (http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/120923/no-entregaremos-nuestros-
recursos-a-otros-paises). [Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
16
 See, for example, the national secretary of the First Justice party, Tomas Guanipa, who 
directly suggests that the Venezuelan government is offering the country to “Chinese 
imperialism” in spite of its incisive rhetoric against “US imperialism”. In “Guanipa critica 
endeudamiento de Venezuela con el Fondo Chino”, El Universal, July 21, 2014. 
(http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/140721/guanipa-critica-endeudamiento-de-
venezuela-con-el-fondo-chino). [Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
17
 “Maduro: Oposición miente sobre acuerdos con China”, in El Universal, July 24, 2014. 
(http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/140724/maduro-oposicion-miente-sobre-
acuerdos-con-china). [Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
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China seems to follow its prevailing opposition during Chávez‟s administrations18. Recent 
statements of the vice-president of the organization, Carlos Larrazábal, also raise frontal 
criticisms of the relations with China, especially the compensated trade attached to the 
Chinese loans
19
. 
On the other side, some opposition leaders and newspaper columnists recognize that 
China‟s loans-for-oil scheme is not evil per se, given the current fiscal crisis and provided that 
it is conducted in a transparent way (Santos, 2012). This leaves the following question: would 
the growing presence of China not be interrupted by an eventual electoral transition of power 
in Venezuela? The positive answer is reinforced by the apparent structural dependency of the 
Venezuelan state – not only the current Venezuelan administration (Chavez-Maduro). 
 Notwithstanding, there are some issues in the China-Venezuela bilateral relations that 
are less politicized. For example, military cooperation, oil-related joint ventures, technical and 
agricultural cooperation, etc. For these issues, our research has found less evidence of 
oppositional criticism. In conclusion, this difference in the political behavior of opposition 
forces suggests that the nature of the issue impacts on its greater/lower political contest. 
 
3.3 The Brazilian case: complex economy and sector-specific mobilization 
In the case of Brazil, we see a much less public mobilization on China-related issues and 
mostly concentrated in economic sectors. In our observations, what we have found is 
predominantly a sector-oriented pattern of collective organization, instead of the patterns we 
have observed in the previous cases, in which the issue is contested in the political arena. In 
relation to China‟s growing economic presence in Brazil, Brazilian social actors such as 
entrepreneurships, by far the more organized social sector in terms of Brazil-China relations, 
seem to be following the suggestion implied in the formula repeatedly uttered by Chinese 
authorities; namely that China‟s presence in Latin America is to be treated as “business only”.  
It seems that Brazilian economic sectors have learned from recent experiences, mainly 
in the negotiations that intended to create a Free Trade Area for Americas (FTAA, 1995-
2005) and, to a lesser extent, in the earlier successful creation of the Southern Cone Common 
Market (MERCOSUR, 1990-1994). In addition, they present a de-centralized politicization 
                                                 
18
 See “Fedecámaras: Gobierno promueve la inversión china y no la nacional”. In: La 
Patilla, August 7, 2015 (http://www.lapatilla.com/site/2015/08/07/fedecamaras-gobierno-
promueve-la-inversion-china-y-no-la-nacional/). [Accessed on 5 October 2015] 
19
 See “Carlos Larrazábal: En Venezuela el Gobierno está trancado”. In: FEDECÁMARAS 
official website (http://www.fedecamaras.org.ve/detalle.php?id=3133). [Accessed on 5 
October 2015] 
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dynamics probably due to the much more complex economic structure that we encounter in 
the Nicaragua and Venezuela cases.  
Notwithstanding, we are still exploring the possible spaces through which the private 
sectors are advancing their own interests in terms of favorable foreign relations with the Asian 
giant. We are quite curious to find this hypothesized pattern in Brazil, as long as a great 
amount of our analytical concern with politicization comes from relatively well established 
literature produced on the Brazilian foreign policy politicization. According to these 
researches, the simultaneous processes of globalization, economic opening and 
democratization have exposed Brazil‟s foreign policy to more assertive postures from a 
plurality of social actors (Lima, 2000), which, consequently, have eroded the traditional 
centrality of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the decision-making process (Milani and 
Pinheiro, 2013). As a result, this literature points to the need for understanding foreign policy 
as a public policy like any other (Salomón and Pinheiro, 2013).  
Would China-Brazil expanding economic relations not be included in this broadly 
alleged process of increasing domestic politicization of the Brazil‟s foreign policy? Or do they 
occur but the existing politicization follows a more informal and maybe direct path until the 
Brazilian authorities? Although we still do not have a simple answer to these intriguing 
questions, we will suggest some topics related to the phenomenon that we are interested in 
through this research in progress.  
The government-entrepreneurships relations in Brazil deserve special attention as they 
have a long-established pattern of complex sectoral dialogue. In this country, we find an 
uncommon strength of employers‟ organizations – namely the federation‟s states industrial 
organizations, such as FIESP, FIERGS, FIESC, FIE/PR and FIE/MG or the Industries‟ 
National Confederation (CNI), in the industrial sector, and the Agriculture‟s National 
Confederation (CNA), Agribusiness Brazilian Association (ABAG) and the Brazilian 
Cooperative‟s Organization (OCB).  
The entrepreneurships‟ abovementioned political learning of the private sector, to which 
we referred above, comes especially from the FTAA negotiations. One good example is the 
fact that the private sector founded new mechanisms of coordination, as the Brazilian 
Entrepreneurships‟ Coalition (CEB). It was created and supported by the CNI after the 
Cartagena Second Ministerial Summit of the Americas in 1996, when the industrial sector 
perceived the high costs of non-mobilizing around the FTAA negotiations, once in the 
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America‟s Entrepreneurships‟ Forum the US private sector had showed notable activism and 
high convergence with the United States government (Santana, 2001).  
By creating CEB, the private sector intended to react against the governmental 
centralization of the access of them to the FTAA negotiation. In order to participate in the 
America‟s Entrepreneurships‟ Forum, they even depended on a discretionary invitation made 
by Brazil‟s Ministry of Foreign Relations (Jatobá, 2011). Since then, CEB has gained 
institutional stability and is actually an important coalition space for the industrial sector, 
gathering more than 170 members among companies, associations, federations, and other 
representatives of the industrial sector linked to CNI. Their main role is to follow international 
negotiations, exert pressure, though not necessarily by fully transparent means, over the 
Brazilian authorities and decision-makers. A similar sectoral organization is found in the 
agriculture sector: the three sectoral organizations (CNA, ABAG and OCB) created, in 
February of 1999, the Permanent Forum of Agricola International Negotiations, also in the 
context of the FTAA negotiations (Carvalho, 2003). 
This complex sectoral organization style is also present in a more specific example, 
directly related to the economic relations of Brazil and China. In 2004, the Brazil-China 
Entrepreneurship Council (Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China) was created, gathering about 
70 of the most important companies of the two countries. The council has a strong actuation 
in what relates to the bilateral economic relations, promoting entrepreneurships‟ meetings and 
thematic seminars, elaborating reports and sharing economic data, and, most importantly, 
advancing the private sector‟s interests vis-à-vis Brazilian and Chinese authorities. Their main 
strategies are to represent the associates‟ interests and increase their internal coalition, besides 
promoting their research and information policies. It therefore makes sense that the Council 
has central companies involved in Brazil-China trade and investment relationships in its 
portfolio. 
 It seems important to stress that it was only after China‟s entrance to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December of 2001 that a trade boom between the two countries 
started. According to Albuquerque (2014: 108), despite the fact that the bilateral relation was 
classified by the successive administrations of the presidents Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), it was only during the Lula government (2003-
2010) that bilateral relations gained momentum, following a significant growth of trade and 
investment in a context of diplomatic emphasis on South-South relations. 
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During that president‟s mandate, however, a good moment to analyze would be in 2004 when 
Brazil recognized China as a state-market – a decision with many concrete consequences that 
was made by the president without any broad public circulation of the issue. When it was 
publicly announced by the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Commerce, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, these two authorities revealed that China‟s authorities wanted Brazil 
to take this stance, but it was only made possible after new trade and investments agreements 
were established
20
. The decision made in 2004 is still to be regulated, and for this reason it is 
possible to find some questioning – or politicizing actions, we should say – mainly by the 
industrial sector, fearful of negative impacts of low-cost Chinese manufactured goods in the 
Brazilian market. In 2004, the private sector protested, especially one of the strongest 
industrial organizations, the FIESP. Since then, FIESP has repeatedly put pressure on Brazil‟s 
government to review the decision of accepting China as a market economy. Since the 
protests of the private sector did not produce concrete results during the Lula administration, 
the FIESP tried to improve their opposition in the beginning of President Dilma Rousseff‟s 
first term
21
.  
Meanwhile, however, even such an important decision by the government, made inside 
the governmental cabinets, did neither generate public reactions as we perhaps could have 
expected among political parties nor any parliamentary coalition, as we could expect, at least 
in the political opposition. The by far most questioning move we found was a technical 
consultation inside the Chamber of Deputies, about the procedural correctness of the measure 
– that is, it was mainly of a technical character and, moreover, had no higher public visibility 
at all
22
.     
Nevertheless, the Brazilian case seems to reinforce the idea that the strong and growing 
economic presence of China in the continent had indirect political effects, as long as it helped 
                                                 
20
 “Brasil aceita China como economia de mercado”, BBC-Brasil.com, November 12, 2004 
(http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2004/11/041112_jintao.shtml). [Accessed 
on 5 June 2015]  
21
 See, for example, “Fiesp pede ao governo que não considere China como economia de 
mercado”, O Globo, February 22, 2011.(http://oglobo.globo.com/politica/fiesp-pede-ao-
governo-que-nao-considere-china-como-economia-de-mercado-2820036#ixzz3pVBiRKOV). 
[Accessed on 5 June 2015] 
22
 The technical consult was promoted in November 18, 2004, by the representative Carlos 
Melles (of then Liberal Front Party, PFL, now Democrats‟ Party, DEM) in the Deputy‟s 
Chamber‟s Foreign Relations Commission. Actually, we think that his action does not deserve 
much more than a footnote. The consult and the public servant‟s response, concluding for the 
procedural correctness of the measure as it was taken by government, may be found at the 
Commission‟s website.  
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to maintain favorable conjuncture conditions for Brazil to reach important, though not so 
high, levels of economic growth during the 2000s and elevate levels of social policies‟ 
expenditures. Nonetheless, this possible supportive role of China in Brazil‟s growth and social 
expenditures has not left us with any evidence in the other two cases, in the sense that even 
though China was important to the Lula‟s and Dilma‟s administrations public policies, this 
fact did not motivate the opposition to politicize the issue.  
 
Final Remarks 
This text was intended to present an exploratory study of the different domestic political 
reactions to the growing economic presence of China in three differently sized countries of 
Latin America – Brazil, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In our search for evidence of the 
politicization of China-related issues in the foreign policy agendas of the three analyzed 
countries, we also found three different ways of interaction with existing political cleavages 
and coalitions, as well as contrasting levels of intensity of the politicization itself. 
In Nicaragua, the presence of China restructures the existing political cleavages and 
gives new dynamics to both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces. It is generating a 
broad social coalition against the mega construction of the Canal. Therefore, it is an 
interesting case of how a massive, although singular, presence of a China-funded investment 
may have cross-societal impacts in terms of its domestic politicization.  
In Venezuela, the already existing strong political cleavage between government and 
opposition incorporates China more as another issue of their political clashes. The highly 
polarized Venezuelan political arena phagocytes the economic presence of China, as long as it 
became an important source of foreign capital inflows which otherwise could be very difficult 
for the Maduro government to attract. 
In Brazil, the presence of China is apparently diluted into specific sectoral effects. Their 
respective politicization movements, which are formed and conducted by the private sector 
along the axis defensive-offensive commercial interests, are deepening the already existing 
organizational structure. It becomes clear that these traditionally strong business groups are 
even more conscious of the need to advance their interests not only by making business, but 
also through permanent contact with government authorities and decision-makers. 
Beyond the pure identification of the politics resulting from the intersection between 
Chinese interests and Latin American foreign policy agendas, questions arise about the 
consequences of this politicization for the future of the China - Latin America agenda in more 
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general terms and whether the political dynamics observed in Brazil, Venezuela and 
Nicaragua are to be seen in similar settings in other cases. Naturally, we are not able to offer a 
complete answer here, but it is at least essential to begin by recognizing the phenomenon as it 
manifests itself in three very different situations. Are the modalities of politicization founded 
in these three cases to be characterized as three specific patterns for further research on how 
China‟s presence in Latin America interacts with domestic political arenas? To what extend 
are these domestic-level dimension disputes to be considered as an important factor in 
explaining successes and failures of the now highly diversified agenda of China - Latin 
America relations? We hope to have settled initial steps in that direction. 
 
References 
Abdenur, Adriana Erthal and de Souza Neto, Danilo Marcondes. 2013. “Cooperación china en 
América Latina. Las implicaciones de la asistencia para el desarrollo.” Íconos-Revista de 
Ciencias Sociales. 47: 69–85. 
 
Academia de Ciencias de Nicaragua. 2014. El Canal Interoceánico Por Nicaragua: Aportes 
Al Debate. Managua: Academia de Ciencias de Nicaragua. 
 
Albuquerque, José Augusto Guilhon de. 2014. “Brazil, China, US: a triangular relation?” 
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. 57(Special Edition): 108–120. 
 
Baltodano, Mónica. 2015. “El impacto jurídico de la concesión canalera.” Confidencial. 15 
June. Available at: http://confidencial.com.ni/archivos/articulo/22011/el-impacto-juridico-de-
la-concesion-canalera [Accessed on 5 October 2015]. 
 
Bernal-Meza, Raúl. 2015. “China - Latin America relations – the Latin American perspective: 
„China and Latin American Relations: The win-win rhetoric‟.” International Workshop: 
China-Latin America Relations – Emerging powers in the Global System, International 
Workshop: China-Latin America Relations – Emerging powers in the Global System, Aalborg 
University. 
 
Bonilla Martínez, Omar. 2014. “La geopolítica petrolera China en Ecuador y el área andina.” 
World Tensions/Tensões Mundiais. 10. Available at: 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&profile=ehost&scope=site&authtype=cra
wler&jrnl=19835744&AN=97330070&h=TVKu2yWarT85aDf8X421tF54xpf%2BWLvTYij
kRAKYjfG2OzuLt5ohNk%2BaR%2F%2F5dHy93uabAP60VY4Mqst5G3XULw%3D%3D&
crl=c [Accessed on 22 August 2015]. 
 
Booth, John, Wade, Christine and Walker, Thomas. 2015. Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 6th ed. Philadelphia: Westview Press. 
 
Carvalho, Maria Izabel Valladão de. 2003. “Estruturas domésticas e grupos de interesse: a 
formação da posição brasileira para Seattle.” Contexto Internacional. 25(2): 363–401. 
 
Fidel Pérez Flores & Daniel Jatobá  JCIR Special Issue (2016) 
 
148 
 
CENIDH. 2015. Derechos Humanos En Nicaragua 2014. Managua: Centro Nicaraguense de 
Derechos Humanos. Available at: http://www.cenidh.org/recursos/40/. [Accessed on 5 
October 2015]. 
 
Coleman, Kenneth. 2015. What Do Nicaraguans Thinks about President Ortega’s 
Interoceanic Canal. 112. Available at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO912en.pdf 
[Accessed on 5 October 2015]. 
 
Daalder, Hans. 1966. “Parties, Elites and Political Developments in Western Europe”. In 
LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M., eds. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
  
Dahl, Robert. 1965. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Di Tella, Torcuato. 2003. Actores Y Coaliciones: Elementos Para Una Teoría de La Acción 
Política. Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella / PNUD. 
 
Ferchen, Matt. 2011. “As relações entre China e América Latina: impactos de curta ou longa 
duração.” Revista de Sociologia e Política. 19(1). Available at: 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rsocp/v19s1/08.pdf [Accessed on 5 June 2015]. 
 
Folkman, David. 2001. La Ruta de Nicaragua, Fundacion Vida, Managua. 
 
Hill, Christopher. 2003. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
HKND Group. 2014. “Nicaragua Canal Project Description.” Available at: http://hknd-
group.com/upload/pdf/20150105/Nicaragua_Canal_Project_Description_EN.pdf [Accessed 
on 5 June 2015]. 
 
Holland, Márcio and Barbi, Fernando. 2010. “China na América Latina: uma análise da 
perspectiva dos investimentos diretos estrangeiros”. In Baumann, R. ed. O Brasil e Os 
Demais BRICs. Comércio e Política. Brasília: CEPAL/IPEA. 
 
Huete-Perez, Jorge, Meyer, Axel and Alvarez, Pedro. 2015. “Rethink the Nicaragua Canal.” 
Science. 347(6220): 355–355. 
 
Jatobá, Daniel. 2011. Democracia, Política Externa e Integração Regional: Um Estudo 
Comparativo das Trajetórias de Argentina e Brasil. PhD Thesis. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de 
Estudos Sociais e Políticos da Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro (IESP/UERJ). 
 
Lima, Maria Regina Soares de. 2000. “Instituições democráticas e política exterior.” Contexto 
Internacional. 22(2): 265–303. 
 
Lima, Maria Regina Soares de. 2013. “Relações internacionais e políticas públicas: a 
contribuição da análise de política externa.” In Marques, E.C. and Faria, C.A.P. de. eds. 
Política Pública Como Campo Disciplinar. São Paulo: Ed. UNESP. 
 
Fidel Pérez Flores & Daniel Jatobá  JCIR Special Issue (2016) 
 
149 
 
Lipset, Seymour and Rokkan, Stein. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments.” In Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New 
York:  Free Press. 
 
Lowi, Theodor. 1964. “American business, public policy, case-studies, and political theory.” 
World Politics. 16(4): 677–715. 
 
Martí i Puig, Salvador. 2013a. “Nicaragua 2011: hegemonía sandinista y erosión de la 
accountability.” In Alcántara Sáez, M. and Freidenberg, F. eds. Elecciones Y Política En 
América Latina 2009-2011. Cidade do México: IFE/Miguel Ángel Porrúa. 
 
Martí i Puig, Salvador. 2013b. Nicaragua: la consolidación de un régimen híbrido.” Revista de 
Ciencia Política (Santiago). 33(1): 269–286. 
 
Martin, Lisa. 2000. Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Commitments. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Mesa de la Unidad Democratica. 2012. “Lineamientos para el programa de gobierno de 
unidad nacional (2013-2019)”. 
 
Milani, Carlos Roberto Sanchez and Pinheiro, Letícia. 2013. “Política externa brasileira: 
desafios de sua caracterização como política pública.” Contexto Internacional. 35(1): 11–41. 
 
Milner, Helen. 1997. Interests, Institutions and Information, Domestic Politics and 
International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
People‟s Republic of China. 2008. “China‟s Policy Paper On Latin America And The 
Caribbean.” Available at: http://china.usc.edu/chinas-policy-paper-latin-america-and-
caribbean [Accessed on 5 June 2015]. 
 
Perla, Héctor and Cruz-Feliciano, Héctor. 2013. “The Twenty-first-Century Left in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua: Understanding Apparent Contradictions and Criticisms.” Latin 
American Perspectives. 40(3): 83–106. 
 
Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy.” World Politics. 
51(1): 144–172. 
 
Salomón, Mônica and Pinheiro, Letícia. 2013 “Análise de Política Externa e Política Externa 
Brasileira: trajetória, desafios e possibilidades de um campo de estudos.” Revista Brasileira 
de Política Internacional. 56(1): 40–59. 
 
Santana, Helton. 2001. “Grupos de Interesse e a Política Externa Brasileira para a ALCA.” 
Contexto Internacional. 23(1): 167–196. 
 
Santos, Miguel Ángel. 2012. “Cuentos del Fondo Chino.” El Universal, Caracas, 2 
September. Available at http://www.eluniversal.com/opinion/120902/cuentos-del-fondo-chino 
[Accessed on 5 June 2015]. 
 
Fidel Pérez Flores & Daniel Jatobá  JCIR Special Issue (2016) 
 
150 
 
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of 
Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Schweller, Randall L. 2004. “Unanswered threats: a neoclassical realist theory of 
underbalancing.” International Security. 29(2): 159–201. 
 
Vadell, Javier. 2011. “A China na América do Sul e as implicações geopolíticas do consenso 
do pacífico.” Revista de Sociologia e Política. 19(1): 57–79. 
 
Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Zuckerman, Alan. 1975. “Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis.” British 
Journal of Political Science. 5 (2): 231–248. 
  
 
 
